The enterprise group form presents special risks of mismanagement when entities in the group are in financial trouble. At the same time, pursing a group interest might assist in resolving the financial difficulties. In any event, delineating rules for this situation is challenging, given the variety of group structures and potential erosion of the benefit of limited liability when the regulation targets the whole group. The conflict is between "entity law" (which addresses each group entity separately) and "enterprise principles" (which address the group as a whole). There is scope for crafting the "wrongful trading" provision, now being adopted as an international standard, to accommodate the group scenario. In this context, enterprise principles should function only to help ascertain the commercial reality, rather than to override entity law.
INTRODUCTION
The paper attempts to tackle the question of managerial duties and responsibilities in the vicinity of insolvency, in a group context. Businesses today are increasingly conducted as groups, as the English regime is known to be pro-entity law (strictly respecting the separate personality of group entities and the limited liability of their parent companies) as exemplified by cases such as Adams v Cape 12 and by the lack of specific regulation concerning groups. 13 However, legal regimes that attempted to devise a sui generis (enterprise law-based) regulation regarding liabilities and responsibilities in a group context have thus far done so with limited success. 14 It is also a key argument of this paper that enterprise law should not override entity law in areas affecting the notion of limited liability.
It should have a more limited role. In the context of managerial obligations, it should facilitate tackling group mismanagement by focusing on the group reality. Furthermore, to the extent that legal regimes will follow UNCITRAL's proposals to adopt a wrongful trading regime in their legal systems, the expansion of this regime to accommodate groups could have the potential to become widely applied.
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The discussion proceeds as follows. The subsequent two parts provide background analysis concerning group structures and company theory regarding limited liability in the context of groups. Thereafter, the paper considers the application of wrongful trading provisions and related remedies to the problem of insolvent entities' directors' managerial 12 [1991] 1 All ER 929. 13 Generally, the group phenomenon is not systematically addressed in English company and insolvency law. An 'enterprise group' is not defined at all. Instead, the legislation provides various definitions of key players in a group (see Companies Act 2006, ss. 1159 and 1162), or concepts such as persons associated or connected with a company and shadow directors which could apply to group relationships (see Insolvency Act 1986, ss. 249, 435 and 251).
14 See e.g. in Germany: Konzernrecht: para.291 et seq of the Aktiengesetz (Stock Corporation Act) 1965 which deals with governance aspects of corporate groups explicitly in legislation and has been criticised for not being sufficiently effective. It has also been observed that the German approach has developed and has become more similar to the English regime (A Daehnert "Lifting the corporate veil: English and German perspectives on group liability" [2007] International Company and Commercial Law Review 393). See also the New Zealand regime discussed below (see n 114-116 and accompanying texts). 15 UNCITRAL standards appear in a Legislative Guide, which is not binding. In other contexts, e.g. within Europe, proposed regulation may be more prescriptive, e.g in the form of a directive. The EU Commission has recently launched a study on directors' liability including in the zone of insolvency, to support the Commission in determining its future policymaking in this area (see http://ec.europa.eu/internal_market/company/board/). 6 structure. 20 Entities in such groups operate as distinct companies, but the group as a whole collectively conducts a single business or the entities' affairs are significantly interlinked such that some entities are dependent on other entities in the group for vital functions (e.g. the provision of legal, accounting, tax, and insurance services). In these types of groups, the business interest of entities may be intertwined or entities may be managed in the pursuit of alien group objectives, which may not always squarely fit with each entity's own narrow interests. 21 Here, too, there may be considerable divergence, though. Thus, integration may result from either coordination of key strategies or from close central control and involvement of a parent company in the day-to-day activities of its subsidiaries. Integration may be manifested in representations to the public and to creditors, or only revealed when considering, for example, how central functions are carried out or the way the business is financed. Integration may also be evident in the different potential legal structures -not only the classic pyramid structure where a parent controls a subsidiary, but also, for example, where the management of affiliates is coordinated across the entities' boards and the whole enterprise's "nerve centre" is in fact located outside the corporations themselves. 22 Groups may also be a mix of different organisational structures, for example, a conglomerate that is split into several integrated divisions operating in different industries.
Notwithstanding the prevalence of the group phenomenon and the specific problems it presents, legal regimes often avoid providing explicit rules, which would address the particular issues arising with regard to the group structure. 23 Indeed, the diversity of groups' handled on a separate basis. There may be confusion regarding the interests that should be considered by directors, or specific risks when intra-group transactions take place in close proximity to the onset of insolvency proceedings. Other problems arise regarding the presentation of the groups' financial affairs or in relation to certain prohibitions which could be circumvented if no consideration is given to the interrelation among entities in a group.
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The question is whether to address the group as one whole or to ignore the existence of the group (and the interrelations among the group entities) and treat each entity as a separate legal person. Here, the traditional thinking is grounded in entity law, which deems the separate entity the relevant "player", respecting its distinct corporate personality and the limited liability of its owners or affiliates. In contrast, legal analysis relying on enterprise principles is concerned with the economic reality of the over-arching business enterprise (which includes the separate but related entities that comprise it) and, where appropriate, matching rights and responsibilities to its collective economic function, i.e. to the enterprise as a whole. 25 Thus, the newer enterprise conceptualisation serves to address groups as such and, to some extent, to redefine the legal boundaries of the business organisation so that they correspond with economic reality.
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Indeed, one way of addressing the issue of group regulation would be to make a binary choice between these two approaches and apply either entity or enterprise law consistently, in relation to all legal matters arising regarding groups and with respect to all group structures. However, given the variation of group structures (especially the different levels of integration) as well as the myriad purposes of legislation and different areas of the law pertaining to groups' operation or default, a one-size-fits-all rule may not be appropriate.
Both entity law and enterprise principles may have a role to play in the regulation of enterprise groups. 27 Specifically, as submitted below, the choice between the two approaches should depend on the degree to which the economic benefits underlying the concept of limited liability would be defeated by adopting enterprise principles (i.e. by treating the group as a whole).
THE ECONOMIC RATIONALE OF ENTITY LAW AND THE ROLE OF ENTERPRISE PRINCIPLES
As mentioned above, entity law respects the separate personality and limited liability notions in the context of groups. The advantages of these fundamental corporate law concepts are well known. Economic analysis suggests that particularly the provision of limited liability is crucial for encouraging commerce, limiting the risk of investment, and reducing various transaction costs, including those related to monitoring the company's management.
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To some extent, the advantages of limited liability are less significant in cases of centrally controlled groups with closely held subsidiaries where the parent is the sole or primary shareholder. Here the parent company is not an absentee owner investing in various companies. The parent is also likely to monitor the affairs of the subsidiary regardless. 29 Yet, even these sort of groups benefit from the encapsulation of risk, which encourages commerce, since if limited liability was absent, they may not have undertaken the activities that they have organised through subsidiaries. Furthermore, the fact that entity law, particularly provisions for limited liability, facilitates the segregation of groups of assets among the different entities in a corporate group ("asset partitioning") may work to the benefit of creditors dealing with groups of different forms. Asset partitioning ensures that each entity's creditors will not need to compete with creditors of other entities in the event of insolvency and can, therefore, confine their monitoring efforts to the particular entity to which they gave credit. This, in turn, reduces the cost of credit for legal entities. 30 Indeed, in certain types of groups, asset partitioning might be a deceptive exercise. The paper now proceeds to discuss the application of such approach to the wrongful trading regime (now becoming an international standard). It starts with the obligation of the directors of the financially troubled entities, and thereafter considers the group liability for the insolvent entity's debts. For each of these aspects, the English approach to wrongful trading and related remedies in a group context is considered, before proceeding to propose the desirable approach that could be adopted as an international standard.
DIRECTORS' OBLIGATIONS WHEN THEIR ENTITY (MEMBER OF AN ENTERPRISE GROUP) IS ON THE BRINK OF INSOLVENY
Limited liability and asset partitioning would require, in principle, that directors promote the success and pursue the interests of the specific entity they direct. They should respect the limited liability of their company and not sacrifice its interests in order to promote the interests of the group. Yet, in terms of economic reality, the interests of the group and the interests of specific entities within the group may be intertwined, especially where the group is integrated to some degree. The question is to what extent this economic reality should play a role within the law on directors' duties at the time when the company is on the brink of insolvency. 38 English law is somewhat ambiguous on this issue.
I ENGLISH LAW'S APPROACH AND THE NEED FOR CLEARER REGULATION
English law strictly adheres to the doctrines of corporate personality and limited liability, in the context of groups as well. 39 In accordance with this approach, it requires that directors promote the success of the entity that they direct as a distinct legal person with its own separate creditors, even though it is a member of a group. 40 In the context of insolvency, directors of companies that belong to an enterprise group could be exposed to liability claims had not considered the separate interests of the subsidiary and specifically the interests of the creditors (of that subsidiary) as the company was insolvent at the time of the agreement.
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English courts have acknowledged, though, that it may be difficult to draw a clear line between the interests of the subsidiary and the interests of the other entities in the group.
Thus, in Facia Footwear 43 the court refused an application for summary judgement against directors in circumstances where the subsidiary's directors made significant payments to other group entities under group arrangements, which included cross-guarantees. The court took into account the fact of inter-dependence between the group entities. This meant that if the corporate group collapsed, the subsidiary would collapse as well. Thus, the intention of the directors to keep the group afloat coincided with the interests of the subsidiary. 44 It has been held that the question that should be asked in each case is whether the directors considered the interests of their own company in taking an action -which on its face benefited the parent company, another affiliate, or the group as a whole -or rather took the action in disregard of their own company's interest. 45 Directors should be particularly careful to consider the interests of the creditors when the company is on the brink of insolvency, though English courts have admitted that it may be hard to ascertain benefits or detriments in a group context. As noted in Klempka v Miller 46 :
In essence, the complaint is that the common group directors preferred the interests of extent. In principle, in a group context, directors should ensure that they take such steps with regard to the situation and interests of the particular entity they direct.
Directors may pursue a group interest as a step to avoid or minimise the effect of the entity's insolvency
The wrongful trading provisions proposed as international standards also seek to ensure, though, that directors have sufficient flexibility to consider what is best for the company at the time of financial distress. Specifically, the standards encourage directors to explore rescue possibilities. 48 In accordance with this approach, it is required that directors take steps to avoid insolvency or minimise its extent, rather than to immediately initiate insolvency proceedings. In many group scenarios, especially where groups were integrated, taking such steps effectively would require mutual assistance among and cooperation with the other entities in the group. An enterprise approach would highlight this reality.
Specifically, attention should be given to long-term or other indirect perceived benefits (from pursuing group interests or assisting other entities in the group) when considering the degree of group integration and interdependence, and the position of the entity in issue within the group enterprise. Indeed, what may be regarded as a detrimental step in circumstances where the entity has operated as a stand-alone business, not linked to other entities, may in fact be a reasonable step to take in the zone of insolvency, in a group context. For example, in circumstances where the business of the relevant subsidiary was generally dependent on the larger business of the group or on some of its related entities, that subsidiary may well need to provide funds or other benefits to its affiliated entities in an attempt to keep the group as a whole afloat including its own business. Another example is a 48 Ibid., recommendation 1, purpose of legislative provisions.
situation in which a subsidiary has delayed entry into insolvency proceedings because it anticipates a deal for the sale of the group as a whole (or of a division in the group). This is more likely when a group has been integrated in terms of its business and is run as a single enterprise. In such group types, the insolvency of the entity will often affect other entities in the group (and vice versa). Yet, even in groups which were rather loosely controlled and decentralised prior to the crisis (i.e. subsidiaries were managed autonomously and only strategic key decisions were coordinated on the group level), control may tighten in the zone of insolvency, for good commercial reasons beneficial to the (now insolvent) entity's creditors. Thus, the financial crisis may accelerate and increase the centralisation of the group management, as closer coordination of the affairs may be required in order to maximise the efficient handling of the group business, for example the coordination of a reorganisation. To the extent that the interest of the insolvent entity was taken into account in the course of the "twilight zone control", and the chosen strategy was reasonable and instrumental to avoiding insolvency or minimising its effect, the directors should not be liable for wrongful trading. In fact, they may use the enterprise approach, which points out to the group reality, when defending themselves against allegations of liability for wrongful trading. Wrongful trading regimes should clarify that managing an entity in times of crisis with a group-wide perspective is legitimate, and steps to avoid or minimise the extent of insolvency may include assistance to other group entities. This would ensure due respect of limited liability and asset partitioning, while granting directors sufficient flexibility to take action that is beneficial for the financially troubled entity within the economic context of the enterprise group operation.
At the same time, in a group context, directors should be cautious not to be complacent with regard to the insolvent entity creditors' interests by, for example, providing funds or assets to other entities in the group, where this is not likely to benefit the entity, which is in financial trouble. As will be discussed further below, 49 particular attention is required to circumstances where certain group entities were in a significant disadvantageous position within the group (for example where they were formed to "serve" the group). In those circumstances, persons other than the direct directors (e.g. the parent company) may be liable for the entity's debts, yet the entity's managers too should be able to show that they attempted to avoid harm to creditors in those scenarios, to the extent possible.
Comparison with international standards regarding voidable transactions in a group context
The approach proposed above is similar to the treatment of voidable transactions in a group context, which was previously adopted in the UNCITRAL Insolvency Guide. In that regard, UNCITRAL has suggested permitting courts to take into account that transactions took place in the context of an enterprise group. Specifically, the court should consider:
". . . the relationship between the parties to the transaction; the degree of integration between enterprise group members that are parties to the transaction; the purpose of the transaction; whether the transaction contributed to the operations of the group as a whole; and whether the transaction granted advantages to enterprise group members or other related persons that would not normally be granted between unrelated parties." 50 Thus, the recommendations refer to a host of considerations of circumstances concerned with the inter-links between group entities. In other words, it is acknowledged that enterprise law has a role to play. However, the recommendations do not suggest an across-the-board 49 See the discussion below regarding group obligations when entities in the group are on the brink of insolvency. 50 Part three of the UNCITRAL Insolvency Guide, recommendation 217.
elimination of transactions, ignoring the separation between group entities. Entity law prevails (transactions are considered to have taken place between separate entities), yet enterprise principles are utilised in order to reveal the true nature of a transaction. Thus, the general rule, according to the basic voidable transactions recommendations in the Guide, is that transactions with related persons should be more harshly scrutinised by adopting certain presumptions and facilitating proof of the elements of the provisions. 51 However, the additional enterprise considerations may actually assist in upholding transactions, which might have been avoided had they taken place between unrelated parties. Indeed, a group functional structure may suggest that benefits accruing to one group entity from a transaction were highly dependent on and related to the benefits accruing to other group entities or to the group as a whole.
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Likewise, in the context of wrongful trading provisions, entity law should generally prevail in the sense that directors' obligations should be to their company. However, the group reality must be taken into account to reveal the true nature of the steps and activities taken by directors, specifically whether such steps in fact benefited the entity's creditors.
Additionally, similar to the approach regarding vulnerable transactions, which more closely scrutinise transactions between related companies, special regard is required in the wrongful trading regime context to the possibility that entities were abused or neglected by the group.
We now turn to discuss these scenarios, and generally what should be the obligations of persons outside the entity in distress, in relation to its insolvency. 
GROUP OBLIGATIONS WHEN ENTITIES IN THE GROUP ARE ON THE

BRINK OF INSOLVENCY
Limited liability's primary implication is that only the company itself is liable for its debts. In most legal systems this concept prevails both in the context of single companies and in the context of groups. 53 However, as noted above, the group structure presents special opportunities for abuse of the corporate form and neglect of entities, especially in times of financial crisis. At the same time, though, coordinated management of the group could assist in saving the group business. The question is how standards regarding directors' pre insolvency obligations should accommodate this aspect of the group case -on the one hand ensuring that creditors are protected from group abuse and on the other, enabling the necessary suppleness needed for reaching effective solutions in times of financial crisis.
I ENGLISH LAW'S RELUCTANCE TO IMPOSE GROUP LIABILITY
As noted above, under English law, directors owe their duties to their company. This is the case even where the company is a parent company holding subsidiaries. 54 If the subsidiary becomes insolvent, the general principle is that only the subsidiary is responsible for its debts and the parent company does not bear any liability in this respect. 55 Generally, ignoring limited liability ("lifting the veil") is rare and confined to circumstances in which the corporate structure was a sham and was used to evade the law. 56 This narrow exception to limited liability might not cover situations where groups operated through subsidiaries for various commercial reasons, however those subsidiaries' creditors have suffered harm because of the way the group was managed, for example due to a group policy which investigation of the issues of public policy than is open to a judge hearing an interlocutory application to strike out a pleading.
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Office holders will be reluctant, therefore, to initiate proceedings against affiliated entities or their directors under the English regime. Indeed, it has been observed that utilising the shadow directorship concept, in order to prove a claim for wrongful trading is a speculative venture for liquidators. 70 The absence of a clear approach regarding group responsibilities renders the task of bringing group entities to account even more daring. The result is that instead of deterring group mismanagement, the current approach might deter office holders from pursuing culpable managers.
II ACCOMODATING THE REALITY OF GROUP MANAGEMENT AND CIRCUMSTANCES OF GROUP MISMANAGEMENT WITHIN THE BEST PRACTICE STANDARDS
Concepts such as shadow directorship provide partial solutions
The new international standards on managerial obligations (proposed by UNCITRAL) the shadows and in effect centrally control the subsidiaries, which form part of an integrated closely linked enterprise. In this respect, the concept of the shadow director is particularly useful as it is based on economic reality of actual intervention in the management rather than on formal relationship of ownership of the subsidiary.
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However, the concept of shadow director may only address certain specific scenarios whereby the company's directors were accustomed to act according to the instructions of other persons. 74 In a group case, questions of mutual liability may arise in other situations. This is because the commercial reality of the group is different from that of the single entity, which is managed either by its own appointed or de facto directors or by other persons that instructed the managers. An entity belonging to an enterprise group may have taken part in the overall management of the group enterprise and the group strategy may have had implications on the entity's financial situations in different ways. Thus, while a broad definition of "director", specifically the concept of the shadow director, could be helpful for group cases (as well as in cases of single companies), the principles regarding group liabilities for mismanagement in the vicinity of insolvency require some further evolution to fit with the complexity of this business structure.
No strict group liability
As proposed above, limiting the liability and responsibility of parent companies and other entities or persons within the group (to the debts of the insolvent entity) is supported by a viable economic rationale. Unless the affairs of the group entities were intermingled, the veil should not (without more) be lifted. circumstances of fraud, such subsidiaries may not themselves carry out their business fraudulently, as their directors may have been unaware of the fraudulent intentions of the related company (or its directors), for instance by allowing the subsidiary to trade, knowing that it will not be able to repay its debts. The related company's potential liability should be considered, however, even when the subsidiary's own management did not carry on the business in a fraudulent manner.
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Decentralised and horizontal managerial group structures should also be taken into account. Here, it may be difficult to identify a single entity which owned and centrally controlled (or instructed) the entity in insolvency. In fact, the managements of a federation of affiliates may have acted in concert. While the entities in such groups may have their own decision-making processes and remain formally independent, a large degree of cooperation among the different boards may still exist. Thus, the directors of the insolvent entity may be well aware of the group interest and the circumstances pertaining to the decision to take a particular course of action regarding the entity. Again, they need not surrender control or avoid making judgements, but rather, in this scenario, be part of a coordinated management of the group. In these cases, if the management was reckless or fraudulent, the direct managers of the entity may be responsible, but other entities and directors outside the entity may be liable too, even though they have not overridden the judgement of the appointed directors or assumed the role of directors of the specific entity. commencement of insolvency proceedings, i.e. only at the time when insolvency has become a real threat, when there may be greater incentives to divert assets from one of the group's entities to another or abandon certain entities considered to be "lost causes". It should be acknowledged, that the fact that affiliates are economically and managerially inter-linked or are held by a parent company having the capacity to control their affairs might lead to greater intervention in times of crisis that could harm creditors.
Best practice standards regarding directors' obligations could be developed accordingly. They should impose obligations to avoid insolvency or minimise its effect not only on directors (broadly defined) but also, explicitly, on affiliated entities and their directors that could influence the insolvent entity's affairs to the detriment of its creditors, without necessarily instructing its managers in a pervasive and consistent manner. Merely relying on concepts such as de facto and shadow directors is insufficient. An enterprise approach, which focuses on the economic reality of the group's organisational and managerial structure, is required in order to facilitate the identification of those in the group that might have acted wrongly in the vicinity of a group entity's insolvency.
Enterprise law pointing to particular circumstances of mismanagement and abuse
An enterprise approach could further assist the regulation of group managerial obligations (when insolvency is looming) and facilitate tackling what may be called "group wrongful trading" by identifying particular risks of abuse and mismanagement in a group context. In this respect too, concepts such as shadow directorship are only of limited use, since they say nothing about the content of the obligation that may be imposed on related entities in a group.
Indeed, group mismanagement may go beyond the conventional understanding of what amounts to wrongful trading and the regulation of such behaviour may require a stricter approach in certain circumstances.
Thus, in addition to the usual wrongful trading scenario, where directors (including shadow directors) continue to trade or take business risks knowing that insolvency is unavoidable and not taking sufficient steps to minimise the harm to creditors, an enterprise approach could point to specific scenarios where group entities were particularly vulnerable.
Such scenarios should raise a presumption of group wrongful trading, which enterprise groups, operating in this way, could rebut only if they are able to show that they actively addressed the situation.
Managerial patterns rendering certain entities particularly vulnerable would include integrated groups, which adopted a group strategy that favoured the interests of the group as a whole (or certain parts of the group) over the interests of certain group entities. 78 This could manifest itself not only in pyramid centrally controlled structures but also in horizontal patterns of groups where management of the entities was coordinated and affiliates operated in pursuit of alien group interests. Specifically alarming would be the case of the "subservient" subsidiary, 79 which merely served the group, i.e. supported certain entities in the group or otherwise assisted in achieving group profit-maximisation policy, but was unable to make profits essential to meet its liabilities. Also problematic is the case of the undercapitalised subsidiary. Indeed, undercapitalisation is a probable scenario in a group context, where funds may be available from other entities in the group in the ordinary course of business-reducing the practical importance of adequate capitalisation. 80 . The problem may also arise in groups with lesser degrees of integration where in the normal course of business the insolvent entity may have been independent (with minimal supervision by the parent). However, such managerial style and structure may change when financial crisis is looming. In such cases, group-wide decisions may take place to the detriment of the financially distressed entity -business opportunities may be diverted to other parts of the enterprise and/or assets may be transferred to other entities in the group at nonmarket rates. 81 Subsidiaries may also be in a particularly vulnerable position if they were set up or utilised by the group to absorb losses, bad assets or the more risky activities of the business.
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International best practice standards on directors' obligations should require, that in cases of groups that adopted a strategy which rendered certain entities vulnerable and susceptible to insolvency, those with influential control over such entities must take active steps to ensure that the entity can nonetheless avoid insolvency or (where insolvency is unavoidable due to other reasons) minimise its extent. This may include injection of funds and creation of business opportunities. Unless it is possible to show that such specific steps were taken, liability will be imposed. The office holder would only need to establish the fact that the entity in issue was in a vulnerable position within the group.
Indeed, it should also be acknowledged that it is often the group that can actually assist (rather than harm) the insolvent entity in resolving its financial difficulties, for example by providing business opportunities, new financing, guarantees to lenders and so forth. It is paramount that the law on directors' duties (extended to impose group liability in certain circumstances) does not discourage groups from taking such actions. Yet, the wrongful trading approach as manifested in the international standards, with the elaboration regarding groups proposed here, would in fact support and incentivise such behaviour. It would require taking steps to avoid insolvency or minimise its extent, rather than impose strict liability on related entities, while taking due account of the group reality. This means that in the absence of abusive relationship or involvement in the entity's management, related entities and their directors need not be concerned at all with taking steps to address the financial situation of the troubled entity. 83 Additionally, where there was such involvement, steps taken by the group management (including in pursuing of group interests) aimed at assisting and rescuing a subsidiary would be taken into account favourably when considering potential liabilities.
III ALTERNATIVE MEANS FOR ADDRESSING GROUP MISMANAGEMENT
There may be alternative ways for addressing the problem of group liability, other than by developing the wrongful trading regime. 84 However, such measures are often either too wide or too narrow to address the complexity of the group scenario. One notable measure is the contribution orders regime, available in New Zealand. 85 This regime appears particularly attractive since it provides a measure "tailored-made" for groups in insolvency. It is not attached to a general duty imposed on companies and directors, but rather it applies only to enterprise groups. In this respect, it allows obligating a related company to contribute funds to the insolvency estate of the company in liquidation. The contribution order is grounded on general fairness considerations, as the court may impose liability if it is "just and equitable" in the circumstances. 86 The court should take into account certain factors before making an order, including the extent to which the related company took part in the management of the company being wound up, its conduct towards the creditors, and the extent to which the winding up is attributable to the actions of the related company. The court is also authorised to consider such other matters as it finds fit.
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Indeed, commentators have referred to this legislation as "revolutionary" in terms of its use of enterprise principles, but further observed that it has not been significantly utilised in practice. 88 A key difficulty has been determining how to reconcile the different interests of the creditors of the insolvent subsidiary and the creditors of the related company, especially where a contribution order would threaten the solvency of the group entity not already subject to insolvency proceedings. 89 Indeed, the problem with the contribution order is that it is rather broad and appears to be based on enterprise law and not to arise from a separate defined duty.
As such, one might argue that, while it is not fair that creditors of an insolvent subsidiary will recover their debts from a weaker entity, the creditors of the related entity may equally argue that they relied on the separate entity and did not expect to compete with the creditors of any other entities in the group. As suggested above, in areas affecting segregation of liabilities and so long as the segregation was kept and the group was not intermingled, enterprise law should assist in clarifying the economic reality, but it should not provide the basis for disregarding the corporate form. Indeed, the wrongful trading regime provides adequate justification for tackling mismanagement. It is also becoming universally accepted that managers should be subject to certain specific (balanced and flexible) obligations during the time when insolvency becomes imminent or unavoidable. In a group, the managerial obligations should derive from the same principles, while enterprise law should assist in accommodating the group economic reality and facilitate tackling group mismanagement. To the extent that liability of a related entity is established on this basis, the fact that an order might then undermine the insolvency of that related entity should not affect the fact of liability and may be treated in the same way as any other claim regarding the assets of the company. Of course, there will be fewer incentives to pursue an insolvent entity. The financial state of the person who breached the obligations is also a factor to take into account when considering whether to impose the remedy and the extent of contribution. The remedies for breach of the duty may also vary and may include both contributions to the insolvency estate and the subordination of directors' claims as creditors. 93 The remedy is discretionary, but the obligation should be fixed, and should derive from a finding of harm to creditors because of wrongful trading. The use of enterprise principles to accommodate the group reality within the wrongful trading regime also ensures that the range of abusive scenarios in a group context is covered. Alternative narrow concepts 90 See the German regime mentioned above (n 23). The alternative regime under the German approach allows groups to formalise their enterprise relationship. In return for the power of control, the parent owes duties of compensation to the creditors and minority shareholders of the subsidiary. Yet, elective regimes as means for addressing the group problem (also once proposed on EC level in the draft 9 th Directive, and in reform proposals in the UK, both initiatives eventually abandoned) entails various practical difficulties including the lack of incentives for groups to opt for this option. 91 e.g. equitable subordination (see in the US, 11 USC s. 510(c)). 92 Indeed, US courts applying the doctrine of equitable subordination would usually look for circumstances of misconduct, mismanagement fraud or undercapitalisation (see Landers, a Unified Approach, pp. 597-606). 93 See under the English wrongful trading regime, the English Insolvency Act 1986, s.215(4). such as lifting the corporate veil in circumstances of sham entities, as means for addressing the problem of group liability for subsidiaries' debts, would not suffice.
CONCLUDING REMARKS
The wrongful trading regime, which has been accepted as international best practice, could be developed to accommodate the group case. The requirement that directors take steps to minimise or avoid insolvency could include activities in pursuance of a group interest where this was a reasonable step in view of the reality of the group. This way, entity law is respected while effect is given to group circumstances. Furthermore, the obligation to attempt to avoid insolvency or minimise its extent, which is imposed on managers (including de facto and shadow directors), should be elaborated to refer to group entities and their directors who had the capacity to influence the entity's affairs in a way detrimental to its creditors. Such influence might not necessarily involve instructing the subsidiary's managers in a pervasive and consistent manner. The standards should also take account of specific circumstances of group abusive relationship, which should raise a presumption of group wrongful trading. Thus, the role designated to enterprise law here is rather modest. Enterprise law does not transcend entity law to impose specific enterprise law remedies. Indeed, this would undermine the objectives of limited liability. The approach should be a cautious one, which respects the corporate form. Yet, the reality of the group should be acknowledged in order to advance the goals of managerial behaviour regulation in the context of insolvency, particularly the varied circumstances of control and influence over other entities in the group and the scenarios of misconduct towards financially troubled entities. Indeed, in a group scenario, it could be difficult to identify the precise boundary of a firm, and in some group types, management responsibilities (and thus, liability) may be blurred across the entities' boards. Consequently, concepts such as shadow directorship may not fit squarely with the economic realities of groups, and enterprise considerations might be instrumental in shedding light on who should be responsible for mismanagement in the time leading up to insolvency and what are the benefits accruing to creditors from pursuing group interests.
It must be acknowledged, though, that since the international standards (and their extension to groups as proposed here) are premised on a flexible balanced approach, bringing proceedings under the regime would remain somewhat speculative. The standards do not prescribe the specific steps that directors should take at times of trouble, 94 and they do not point to specific timeframes. Similarly, in a group context an overall assessment of the circumstances will be required in order to ascertain the potential liability of directors and related entities. Still, the explicit treatment of the group case would contribute to greater clarity in this area while retaining the flexibility essential for rescue promotion and the fine balance between limited liability and economic realities. Addressing the matter on the international level would also have the advantage of promoting harmonisation in this area.
This is particularly important considering that many groups operate across borders, and since groups could "forum shop" in close proximity to the initiation of insolvency proceedings.
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Harmonising the regulation regarding group managerial liabilities could ensure that remedies for group mismanagement are available, wherever the insolvency proceedings against group entities take place.
94 Though the UNCITRAL standards provide more guidance regarding the steps that may be taken by directors, compared with the English wrongful trading provision, which do not delineate any such steps (see WP.113, recommendation 2; cf. English Insolvency Act, s 214). 95 The forum where group members' centres of main interests are located will have jurisdiction to handle the main proceedings under the major cross-border insolvency models. However, COMI is susceptible to a degree of forum selection, not necessarily for the wrong reasons (see e. 
